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I
INTRODUCTION

Over the last decade or so, rational choice theory has begun to transform the
study of U.S. political institutions. The key to its success is methodological.
What it offers, above all else, is a distinctively economic way of exploring a
whole range of institutional issues-from government organization to political
control to performance and accountability-that political scientists have long
approached in less productive ways. As the movement for a new institutionalism
has swept political analysis, rational choice has taken the lead in challenging the
past and charting new paths for the future.1
Analytically, this is all to the good. Substantively, however, there is
something amiss in what rational choice actually has to say about U.S. political
institutions. For while the institutional system has itself been transformed over
the past century, evolving from a nineteenth century system of "congressional
government" 2 into a modern, presidentially led bureaucratic state,3 the basic
thrust of rational choice theory today fails to explain these developments
adequately.
The hallmark of modem U.S. government is presidential leadership. Yet
positive theorists have never known quite what to do with presidents. On
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methodological grounds, they find legislators much easier to deal with. One
reason is that legislators vote, which means that the modeling technology of
social choice can be relied upon to generate theories of their behavior. Another
is that much of what legislators do is motivated by a very simple goal: reelection. Presidents fail both tests. Most aspects of presidential behavior do not
involve voting at all, and electoral concerns are only a small part of what
motivates them.
Because presidents do not fit very comfortably into rational choice theories,
the result is that they typically are left out-a datum so well known among
positive theorists that they informally refer to presidents as "the P-word." Even
when presidents are taken into account, they tend to be cast in a legislative mold,
portrayed simply as wielders of the veto in legislative decisionmaking" or as
undistinguished members of the legislature's enacting coalition.' The point of
these analyses is not to understand the presidency as an institution, but rather
to shed more light on the structures and outcomes of legislative choice.
One could argue that this approach is not such a bad thing. Presidents are
enormously important to U.S. politics, and one can hardly understand how the
system works without taking them fully into account. But theories must start
somewhere, and not every relevant factor need be included right from the start.
Success calls for simplicity, clarity, and manageability. So it may make sense to
start with legislators and thus with Congress in moving toward a theory of
political institutions. Presidents can be incorporated into the theory as time goes
on, once a solid foundation is laid.
But what sounds fine in principle does not work out so fine in practice. The
problem is that these early theories tend to take on lives of their own. They
shape scholarly thinking about the political world, even though they are only
partial perspectives on what politics and institutions are all about, and they
threaten to be misleading if taken alone. In much of positive theory, it is
virtually taken for granted that legislators are in fact the critical players, that
elections and constituency pressures are in fact the key foundations of
governmental decisionmaking, and that Congress is in fact the paramount
institution in the U.S. system.'
These taken-for-granteds are implicit claims about substance. Yet they are
curiously inconsistent with the rise of presidential power throughout this century,
with the growth and reach of the institutional presidency, with the spectacular
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increase in the size, responsibilities, and professionalism of the public bureaucracy, and with the decentralization, fragmentation, and irresponsibility of Congress.
Moreover, nothing in the logic of rational choice requires anyone to embrace
these claims about legislative superiority. That they have gotten tangled up with
the methodology of positive theory is essentially a sociological phenomenon, not
a scientific one.7
We have two purposes here. The first is to bring the presidency more
squarely within the terrain of positive theory by presenting it as a welldeveloped, nuanced, and powerful institution in its own right, rather than as a
caricature whose only role in politics is to make life a little more difficult for
legislators. The second is to argue that, despite positive theory's admiration of
congressional power, presidents actually have substantial advantages over
Congress in the institutional struggle to control government, advantages that lead
to a creeping presidentialization of the system.
To illustrate how all this applies to the substance of U.S. politics, we follow
the theoretical analysis with three brief case studies of political issues that have
a direct bearing on the institutional balance of power: the Civil Service Reform
Act of 1978, congressional oversight and funding of the institutional presidency,
and presidential review of rulemaking by the federal regulatory agencies.'
II
STRUCTURE AND POWER

Under the U.S. constitutional system, the president and Congress are
different institutions with different interests and powers. It is fashionable to say
that these powers are shared rather than separate and to emphasize the need for
cooperation across the branches. 9 But conflict is normal and inevitable. The
system generates a constant struggle for power between the two institutions.
This struggle is most observable in the policy arena, where officials from both
institutions wrangle endlessly over the goals and details of public policy. These
are the conflicts covered daily by the media, and many are of great consequence
for the nation. The more fundamental struggles between the president and
Congress, however, are not nearly as well publicized. Nor, for most observers

7. Terry M. Moe, An Assessment of the Positive Theory of "CongressionalDominance",12 LEGIS.
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in RESEARCHING THE PRESIDENCY: VITAL QUESTIONS, NEW APPROACHES 337-85 (George C. Edwards
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of politics, are they as interesting or comprehensible. These are battles over
structure.
Two kinds of structure are of greatest consequence. The first involves the
institutions that will interpret, elaborate, and carry out public policy: the
bureaucracy. Policies mean little or nothing until they are given concrete
expression through bureaucracy. A powerful, well-designed agency can turn
policy goals into reality, while a weak, poorly designed one can get nowhere.
Because everyone in the policy process knows this, much of the struggle over
policy is really a struggle over bureaucratic structure-the design, location,
staffing, and empowerment of administrative agencies-as well as a struggle to
control them once they are set up. The second kind of structure concerns the
presidency and Congress as institutions and, specifically, their capacities for
exercising power--over policymaking, over the bureaucracy, over one another.
How well each of them succeeds in gaining control of government depends on
how its own institution is internally organized, the kinds of resources it can
marshal, and the authority it can put to effective use.
The struggle for power between the president and Congress, therefore, while
often manifested in well-publicized battles over policy, is largely a structural
matter. It is a matter of how well each institution can engineer the structure of
public bureaucracy and exercise control over it, as well as a matter of which
institution can best structure itself internally to enhance its capacity for power.
A great deal of attention has been lavished on Congress over the years by
positive theorists, but the president's role in all this is poorly understood, to say
the least. Positive theory needs to inquire more seriously into how presidents,
as rational actors, can be expected to approach these basic issues of institutional
development and control, and how their approach compares to what we can
expect of Congress.
A. Background
With presidents, as with so many other subjects, the best way to get a handle
on their behavior is to step back from them, at least at the beginning, and try to
gain perspective on the larger context in which their action takes place. In this
case it is especially helpful to have some idea of what the politics of structural
choice is about, who the contending actors are, and what kinds of structures they
would build if they could.
Most people who do not closely study politics are probably under the
impression that politics is largely about issues of policy, while issues of structure
are decided on more-or-less objective grounds based on the policy goals to be
achieved. This impression, of course, is far from the truth. Precisely because
structure is a major determinant of policy (as well as power and other important
things), people fight over its details, and it is inevitably political.
The politics of structure is like all politics. Its essence is that people with
different interests engage in a struggle to control and exercise public authority.
The struggle arises because public authority does not belong to anyone, but is
simply available to those players that wield enough power under the democratic
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rules of the game to gain control over it. Whoever wins this struggle has the
right to make authoritative decisions for everyone, and thus the right to set up
policies and structures that promote their own interests. The losers have to
accept what the winners impose, even if it makes them absolutely worse off.
Thus, while much good may ultimately come from all this, public authority is by
nature coercive, as is politics. Some people win and some lose.
Bureaucracies and most other political institutions are created through the
exercise of public authority. They arise out of a politics of structural choice in
which the winners use public authority to design new structures and impose them
on the polity as a whole. Because of this, the standard economic ways of
thinking about institutions-in terms of voluntary exchange, contracting, mutual
benefit, gains from trade, transaction costs, collective action problems-can tell
only part of the political story."0 While these aspects of behavior are surely a
big part of the strategies and coalitional processes behind the politics of
structural choice, the typical outcome is that one coalition wins and the other
loses. Most political institutions are not arrangements of mutual advantage, but
vehicles by which winners pursue their own interests.11
Who are the major players in all this?
Although presidents and legislators
actually make the official decisions about structure, they are not always, or even
usually, the prime movers behind the politics of structure, at least in regard to
public bureaucracy. As elected officials, they have incentives (particularly the
legislators) to be responsive to political pressures arising from their respective
constituencies. On issues of structure, virtually all these pressures come from
organized interest groups.
The group basis of structural politics should not be surprising. Ordinary
citizens may be reasonably well informed and interested on issues of policy, and
politicians must pay attention to them. This is not the case, however, for
structural issues, which most citizens regard as boring, arcane, impossible to
understand, and irrelevant to politics. Organized groups, by contrast, are well
aware that policy and structure are but two sides of the same coin, and they
know that their success is crucially dependent on precisely those details of
structure that most citizens ignore. As a foundation for understanding how
presidents and legislators approach the politics of structure, therefore, it makes
sense to think first about the kinds of group pressures they are under. What
kinds of bureaucratic structures do interest groups want? What kinds of
demands do they make on politicians?
A useful baseline is effective organization. A winning group would surely like
to use its authority to create the most effective agency possible. Were the
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winners unconstrained by political problems, they would favor whatever form of
organization, type of staffing, and amounts of discretion seem most conducive to
agency performance. Politics, however, does not allow the winners this luxury.
Indeed, there are several very basic political forces at work here, all of them
anchored in public authority and working against effective organization.
The first is politicaluncertainty. Winning groups that capture authority today
can structure agencies in any way they like. They do not own them, however,
and tomorrow an opposing coalition may gain the authority to control and
undermine what they have created. Recognizing this political uncertainty from
the outset, today's winners need not leave their agencies unprotected. They can
fashion structures to insulate them from ongoing democratic control, exercising
most of their own control ex ante, via structural design, rather than ex post. The
most direct method is to narrow the discretion of bureaucrats and future
authorities by specifying in great detail what agencies are to do-through
decision criteria, procedures, timetables, personnel requirements, and other
restrictive rules.
Obviously, this is not a formula for effective organization. In the interests
of political protection, agencies are knowingly burdened with cumbersome,
technically inappropriate structures that undermine their capacity to do their jobs
well. Nor is this a formula for effective democratic control. Agencies are
insulated precisely because those who create them do not want them held
accountable by tomorrow's authorities.
A second basic force is political compromise. This sounds benign enough,
and in private transactions it usually is. As economic actors engage in voluntary
exchange, make compromises, and hammer out contracts to create their own
structures, all participants expect to benefit (and are free to leave if they do not).
In these contexts, organizations are designed by people who want them to
succeed. 3
This is not so in U.S. politics, where public authority not only guarantees that
there are losers, but an array of checks and balances guarantees that political
victory is difficult in the absence of some compromise with them. The result is
that, if the winners want to shift the status quo, they will usually have to let the
losers participate in the design of any organization being created. The losers,
however, will often press for structures that undermine the organization's
performance. Because U.S. politics is unavoidably a process of compromise,
public agencies will be designed in part by their enemies, who want them to
14
fail.
A third basic force is fear of the state, which arises because groups do not
exercise public authority directly and cannot perfectly control the politicians who

WILLIAMSON, supra note 10, ch. 1.
14. For instance, in creating the Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA"), labor
had to compromise with business, which demanded and received bizarre structural arrangements that
made it virtually impossible for OSHA to do its job effectively. See Terry M. Moe, The Politics of
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do. This has a profound effect on their strategies. For while they are afraid of
their group opponents, they are separately afraid of public officials, who have
their own interests at heart, a measure of autonomy to pursue them, and the
right to use the coercive power of public authority in ways that are unwanted
and perhaps devastating to the groups. When groups press for new laws and
agencies, then, they will try to protect themselves through structure.
As with political uncertainty, the most direct solution is to narrow official
discretion through an array of detailed formal restrictions and requirements.
And these will make it more difficult for agencies to do their jobs. Because of
politics, it is rational for interest groups to fear one another, to fear the state,
and to use structure to protect themselves, even though it may hobble the
agencies that are supposed to be serving them.
B. Legislators and Bureaucracy
If they could, interest groups would build a bureaucracy that is highly
"bureaucratic," buried in formal rules and requirements that undermine
effectiveness and insulate against democratic control. But groups do not exercise
authority. Legislators and presidents do. What kind of bureaucracy do they
want, and how responsive are they to group pressures?
The connection between groups, legislators, and bureaucratic control is not
well understood in the rational choice literature. In the "law and economics"
tradition, heavily influenced by the Chicago school,15 legislators are seen as
suppliers of whatever the groups want (which, in our view, is not far from the
truth). The implicit assumption of this view seems to be, however, that
legislators need to control the bureaucracy in order to do this, or perhaps that
groups demand such control-when, as we have shown, groups often have
strategic reasons for demanding quite the opposite.
The positive theory of institutions, by contrast, is built on theories of voting,
and pays little attention to interest groups as calculating, strategic actors.16 The
spotlight is on legislators, who are seen as deriving great benefit from successfully
controlling the bureaucracy-and being enormously successful at it. In the early
theoretical work, positive theorists put most of the emphasis on bureaucratic
control through ongoing oversight. 7 This, supposedly, was how Congress
dominated the bureaucracy. In more recent work, they have recognized that
there is inevitably a great deal of slippage in this kind of control. Their claim
but in a different way:
now is that Congress still dominates the bureaucracy,
18
structure.
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Shorn of its congressional-dominance trappings, this more recent line of
argument is in the same spirit as our own: bureaucratic structure arises from
political attempts to stack the deck. Yet even this recent work, which is
specifically about legislative control of the bureaucracy, does not present a clear
picture of how or why legislators would want to do this. The rational foundations of control remain murky.
At a minimum, three questions must be answered. First, what kinds of
demands about structure are interest groups bringing to bear on legislators?
Second, to what extent do legislators respond to these demands, and to what
extent can they act autonomously-contrary to what the groups want-in
applying public authority toward their own ends? And third, given whatever
balance legislators strike between responsiveness and autonomy, what kind of
bureaucratic control do they seek?
These issues deserve careful and sustained treatment, and an article about the
presidency is obviously not the ideal place to do it. The best we can do is to hit
some of the more basic points that help clarify things a bit. We have already
done this for interest groups and their demands. We will now turn to legislators
and, very briefly, discuss issues of responsiveness, autonomy, and control.
Legislators are driven by an almost paranoid concern for reelection. 9 They
are not, most fundamentally, in the business of controlling bureaucracy, whether
ex ante or ex post. They are in the business of making themselves popular and
their jobs secure. Because broad constituency influences are largely absent on
issues of structure, legislators' political antennae are fully sensitive to the
demands of organized interest groups, who do care about structure, pressure for
what they want, and know how to use their political resources to shape the
popularity and electoral prospects of legislators.
To be reelected, then, legislators must be highly responsive to group demands
on issues of structure. And if the groups happen to demand bureaucratic
structures that are largely insulated from political control, including legislative
control, then legislators will have strong incentives to do what the groups ask.
If it enhances their electoral prospects to give up control, they will give up
control. For this reason, it is crucial not to think of legislators as the key actors
or prime movers in the politics of structural choice. What legislators do only
makes sense once it is clear what the groups want and why they want it.
This does not mean that legislators will simply operate as faithful agents of
the groups. There is some basis for autonomous action, which the groups regard
as shirking. As in any principal-agent relationship, the incentive and monitoring
mechanisms available to groups are imperfect, and they cannot exact total
compliance. The most obvious occasions for shirking arise when legislators have
personal preferences, such as for ideology, that may conflict with their reelection
goals,20 and imperfect control allows them to go their own way every once in

19.
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awhile. Perhaps more importantly, though, legislators may shirk even when they
are entirely driven by reelection concerns; there may be certain structural choices
that, while opposed by political groups and thus politically costly to embrace, are
still in the electoral best interests of legislators. For purely electoral reasons, in
other words, they may sometimes make autonomous choices about structure that
are unresponsive to group demands.
TWo forms of legislator autonomy, which pull legislators in entirely different
directions, are most worthy of note. First, when faced with conflicting group
pressures, legislators may decide that their own long-term electoral prospects are
enhanced not by embracing the demands of one side or the other, but instead by
delegating broad discretion to the bureaucracy (and thus, at least implicitly, to
the president). This is a strategy by which legislators use structure to protect
themselves rather than groups.
They cannot expect to fool anyone, however, when they do this. The groups
will know they are being stonewalled, and they can mete out punishment as they
see fit. But the advantage for legislators is that they avoid the potentially large,
short-term costs of angering one side and, at the same time, they set up a
structure that helps funnel future conflicts into the bureaucracy and away from
the legislature. Sometimes, especially when passions run high, these benefits of
"shifting the responsibility"21 may be worth their political price.
Second, when winning groups demand structures that insulate their agencies
from political control, legislators may sometimes insist on reserving a greater
measure of control for themselves than the groups would like. The legislative
veto (prior to INS v. Chadha)22 and sunset laws are possible means of doing
this. Costs aside, there are clear benefits to such a strategy, especially for
committee and subcommittee chairs. The greater their control over policy, the
better able they are to supply groups with what they want, and the better
positioned they are to demand votes, money, and other emoluments in exchange.
The idea is to make groups dependent on them, rather than vice-versa.
But this is less attractive than it might appear, at least as an act of autonomy.
The winning groups, which in the current period are the more powerful groups,
may impose heavy political costs when their insulationist demands are ignored.
So getting control may be costly. And once control is obtained, legislators may
become targets for conflicting pressures that they would typically want to avoid
for fear of angering one side or both. In the final analysis, moreover, all this
does not purchase much real control over policy. Oversight for purposes of
serious policy control is time-consuming, expensive, and difficult to do well.

21. Morris P. Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative
Process?, 39 PUB. CHOICE 33 (1982).
22. 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding legislative veto of agency decisions violative of Article I of the U.S.
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Legislators23 typically have much more productive ways to spend their scarce
resources.
As a result, legislators do not typically have strong incentives to buck group
demands and invest in general policy control for themselves. To the extent that
they value control for their own reasons, they value particularized control.24
They want to be able to intervene quickly, inexpensively, and in ad hoc ways to
protect or advance the interests of particular clients or groups in particular
matters. This sort of control can be managed by an individual legislator without
collective action; it has direct payoffs for which he or she can claim credit; it is
generally carried out behind the scenes; and it does not involve or provoke
conflict. The bottom line is that particularized control generates political benefits
for individual legislators with few political costs.
Overall, it would be a mistake to say that legislators do not have any
autonomy and that structural decisions they make on their own account, and not
in response to groups, are of no consequence. The whole issue is a fascinating
and important one that has so far received much less attention from positive
theorists than it deserves. Nonetheless, there is every reason to believe that truly
autonomous action is characteristic of legislative behavior only at the margins.
The electoral connection, combined with the notoriously short time horizons of
most legislators, ensures that they will be highly responsive to group pressures
and, in particular, to the costs groups can impose on them for going their own
way.

Ironically, behaviors that seem to reflect legislator autonomy, such as shifting
the responsibility and asserting legislative control, may often be stimulated and
thus explained by the power of the losing groups. Unlike the winners, they are
in favor of agency discretion if it increases the opportunities for subverting what
the agency does, while they are in favor of greater legislative control if it means
opening the agency and its decisions up to further attack. The legislative veto
is a perfect example. It tends to be the losers, not the winners, who insist on
attaching legislative vetoes to agency mandates.' Thus, what might appear to
be an act of legislative autonomy may well be just another reflection of the
underlying balance of group pressures.
The legislative story of structural politics, in any event, is largely a story
about groups, and Congress is rightly regarded as an extremely receptive place
for the kind of bureaucracy the groups want to create. Legislators are concerned
about their own electoral popularity and are not frequently given to flights of
autonomy or statesmanship. Most certainly, they are not bound by any
overarching notion of what the bureaucracy as a whole ought to look like, nor

23.
(1986).
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are they driven by efficiency, coordination, management, or any other design
criteria that might limit the kind of bureaucracy they can accept. They do not
even insist on retaining true policy control for themselves. Instead, they willingly
build, piece by piece, whatever sort of bureaucratic monstrosity makes the groups
happy. The whole is an accident of aggregation. Only the pieces are important.
That is the way the groups want it.
C. Presidents and Bureaucracy
Presidents do not want the kind of bureaucracy that the other players are
busily trying to create, and they have the power to do something about it.
Because of presidents, the game of structural politics is very different than it
otherwise would be and its outcomes are very different as well.
Presidents pursue interests that are often incompatible with, and indeed
threatening to, the interests of most of the other major players. Their
heterogeneous national constituency leads them to think in grander terms about
social problems and the public interest, and to resist specialized appeals.
Reelection, moreover, does not loom as large in their calculations (and in the
second term, of course, it is not a factor at all). They are more fundamentally
concerned with governance.
Unlike legislators, presidents are held responsible by the public for virtually
every aspect of national performance. When the economy declines, an agency
falters, or a social problem goes unaddressed, it is the president who gets the
blame, and whose popularity and historical legacy are on the line.'
All
presidents are aware of this, and they respond by trying to build an institutional
capacity for effective governance. As a result, they are the only players in the
politics of structural choice who are motivated to seek a unified, coordinated,
centrally directed bureaucratic system. They want a bureaucracy they can
control from the top.27
This quest for control is especially troublesome to the other players, because
presidents act with a great deal of autonomy. This is true in two basic respects.
The first is that their large, heterogeneous constituency, along with the lower
priority they attach to reelection, give them substantial freedom to fashion their
own agenda and to pursue their own brand of control. The second is more
deeply rooted. If there is a single driving force that motivates all presidents, it
is not popularity with the constituency nor even governance per se. It is
leadership. Above all else, the public wants presidents to be strong leaders, and
presidents know that their success in office, along with their place in history,

26.
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hinges on the extent to which citizens, political elites, academics, and journalists
see them as fulfilling this lofty expectation.28
In order to be regarded as strong leaders, presidents must often do what is
popular, and they must govern effectively; these aspects of presidential
motivation are, in large measure, simply derivative components of strong
leadership. But presidents also have to "show the way" by charting new paths
for U.S. society, even when these paths happen to be unpopular at the time.
Strong leaders have the capacity for rising above politics when necessary, for
pursuing their own vision in the face of political odds, and for doing what is right
rather than what is politically safe and expedient. Strong leaders have to
demonstrate their true mettle by being selectively unresponsiveand showing their
autonomy.
Here again, presidents are dramatically different from legislators. For
legislators, autonomy is a form of shirking for which they expect to be electorally
punished if caught. Their incentive structure strongly discourages whatever
inclinations they may have to go their own way. Almost the opposite is true for
presidents. They are expected to take autonomous action boldly and openly, and
their leadership suffers when they fail to do so. Autonomy is an integral part of
their institutional incentive structure, part of what it means to be a good
president.
The great emphasis presidents place on autonomy is a major threat to most
of the organized groups that animate the legislative politics of structural choice.
As far as they are concerned, presidents are unresponsive and out of control.
Worse, presidents not only want structures of a different kind, but they also want
structures that give them control of public bureaucracy-when, of course, what
the groups want is to control the various, uncoordinated pieces of the bureaucracy themselves.
Thus, while winning groups have rational grounds for fearing the state, they
do not fear all state actors equally. They fear legislators a little. They fear
presidents a lot. So as these groups go about building agencies to do their
bidding, they will favor protective structures that are disproportionately aimed
at limiting presidential control. There are various ways of achieving this goal.
They may favor independent forms of organization, insulation of personnel
through civil service and professionalism, and reduced roles for political
appointees, for example. They can also seek protection from the president by
pushing for all the usual formal restrictions on procedure, criteria, and timing
that, by reducing the scope for agency discretion, insulate "their" components of
the bureaucracy from anyone's ex post control.
Not all groups will be dedicated to limiting presidential control. The losing
groups, most notably, may often press for structures that increase presidential
access and influence, because this opens up new channels into an offending
agency and boosts the prospects for opposition and obstruction. Given the
managerial concerns of presidents and their responsibility for the national
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economy, increased presidential control can also lead to constraints on agency
activities that reduce the costs and burdens the losers expect to bear. These
advantages of presidential control are especially attractive to business groups.
For when bureaucracies are created in the modern age, business is often on the
losing side.
While presidents are not without their supporters, then, it is the stronger
side-consisting of the dominant group forces behind the creation of bureaucracy, together with their legislative allies-that opposes them on matters of
structure. The net result is that the legislative politics of structural choice tends
to reflect an antipresidential bias. It routinely promotes the development of an
executive branch that is difficult for presidents to control and ill-suited for
effective performance.
Presidents as Creators of Structure

D.

Presidents are driven to do something about this. There is not much they can
do to change the basic features of separation of powers. By weighing into the
politics of structural choice, however, they can alter the dynamics of institutional
change and fashion a system more to their liking. In some measure, they can
create their own structural context, and either prevent others from doing so or
counteract what others have done.
This challenge has never been central to the way scholars have understood
the presidency. Positive theorists, of course, have largely ignored presidents.
Within the broader literature, however, the mainstream view has long been that
presidents must operate within a basic structural framework, anchored in
separation of powers, granting them far less formal power than they need for
strong leadership, and that their key to success is the resourceful pursuit of
bargaining and cooperation within this framework. The classic work in this
tradition, Richard Neustadt's PresidentialPower, neatly conveys the basic idea
in a phrase so widely accepted that all students of U.S. government have
committed it to memory: "Presidential power is the power to persuade."2 9
More recent work has argued that power in the modem presidency
increasingly has less to do with elite persuasion and more to do with the
presidential strategy of "going public," appealing over the heads of established
powerholders to mobilize the support of the electorate. 30 This strategy, too, has
presidents taking the system as given and maneuvering within it to bring about
desirable outcomes.
Persuasion and bargaining are surely essential to presidential leadership, as
is going public. Yet, presidents do not have to take the system as given. They
can act to change it, and they clearly have strong incentives to do just that.
Those who design and control structure tend to have more than their share of
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advantages when the political game is ultimately played out. The president's
most fundamental job in politics is to take charge of the game: to structure it,
not simply to play it.
How can they do this? The simple fact that presidents are the nation's chief
executives, endowed by Constitution and statute with certain formal powers, is
of enormous consequence for their ability to shape the U.S. institutional system
along presidential lines. These formal powers, combined with certain basic
realities of political life, enable them to make many important structural choices
on their own, without going through the legislative process.31
Although we do not want to be too literal about it, presidents have
something like what economists refer to as "residual decision rights."'32 In the
private sector, these are rights an actor may possess under a contract or
governing arrangement that allow him to take unilateral action at his own
discretion when the formal agreement is ambiguous or silent about precisely
what behaviors are required. Residual rights are characteristic of ownership.
Owners are bound to follow the specific requirements of laws and contracts, but
are free to make decisions about whatever is not specified: the residual.3 3
Presidents, of course, do not own the structures of government. In many
spheres of public organization and policy, however, the absence of specific legal
directives about how to proceed means that presidents are able to make
authoritative decisions on these matters, acting unilaterally and at their own
discretion-as though they have residual decision rights. They can organize and
direct the presidency as they see fit, reorganize, coordinate, impose rules, review
decisions, put their own people in top positions, and otherwise place their
structural stamps on government institutions. Like private owners, they do not
have a completely free hand. There are constraints on what they can do and
rules they must follow. Within these bounds, though, the residual is often
substantial, and they have room to maneuver in making discretionary decisions
about the structures of government. 34
We discuss the reasons for this at greater length in the next section. For now
we simply observe that it gives the president a trump card of great consequence
in his struggle against Congress to gain control of government. He can act
unilaterally in many matters of structure, while Congress, whether in trying to
take actions of its own or in reacting to what the president has done, must go
through a difficult process of legislation-a process in which the president gets
to participate and, if he disagrees, to veto. Moreover, when Congress does
succeed in designing administrative arrangements much to its own liking, the
president can unilaterally respond by adding on new structures, that, in qualifying
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the way these arrangements work, are more conducive to his own interests.
Regulatory review is a prominent example.
As presidents pursue strong leadership, then, their best strategy is not simply
to take structure as given and plunge into the informal politics of bargaining.
Nor is it to concentrate their institution-building energies solely on the legislative
politics of bureaucratic design. In both, especially the former, presidents are
playing on someone else's turf, are being held prisoners of the prevailing
structure, and are acquiescing to an institutional system that is incompatible with
their leadership. Their best strategy is to use their comparative advantage, their
residual decision rights as chief executive, by taking aggressive action within their
own sphere of authority to shift the structure of politics for themselves and
everyone else. Doing so allows them to become, as much as they ever will,
masters of their own destinies, shaping the institutional system along presidential
lines.
III
THE INSTITUTIONAL PRESIDENCY

This is the rational basis for the institutional presidency. Throughout this
century, presidents have struggled to provide themselves with a structural
capacity for leadership by building institutions of their own. For many
reasons-political opposition, the pressure of events, the scarcity of resources,
and imperfect knowledge about what works-this has not been a simple, linear
process of development. But the trajectory is clear, and the motivating force
behind it is the president's drive for leadership in a system largely beyond his
control."
At a very general level, the internal organization of the presidency can be
understood in much the same way as the internal organization of Congress. Both
take forms that facilitate the realization of member interests. Congress, however,
is made up of hundreds of coequal individuals, each concerned with bringing
home the bacon to his or her own constituents; as a group, they face serious
collective action problems in arriving at structures that are stable and mutually
beneficial. In large measure, the committees, procedures, and party leaderships
that organize congressional behavior emerged over time as solutions, albeit
imperfect ones, to these collective action problems. They enable members to
have disproportionate influence over issues of relevance to their own districts,
to make credible commitments in legislative bargaining, to arrive at durable
political deals, and thus to realize gains from trade with their colleagues-all in
the interest of reelection.36
35.
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Similarly, the internal organization of the presidency reflects the interests of
the president. The crucial difference is that the presidency is a unified
institution, in the sense that it has one supreme authority: the president. In
determining his own preferences and making his own decisions, the president
does not suffer from the collective action problems that plague Congress, and he
need not resort to complex structural arrangements for mitigating them. The
task of institution building is much more straightforward here. Presidents are in
charge, and they try to create structures to enhance their own capacity for
effective leadership.
All sorts of functions are essential to effective leadership in modern times,
but most of these the president cannot possibly handle alone. He cannot carry
out his own lobbying with Congress. He cannot recruit, screen, and hire all his
own personnel. He cannot manage his relations with the press. He cannot plan
and schedule all the details of his day-to-day activities. He cannot know enough,
technically or politically, to formulate coherent programs and make wise policy
choices. He cannot personally control the bureaucracy. In the familiar words
of the Brownlow Committee, "[tlhe president needs help." 7
In more modern terms, he needs to rely on agents. Because he does, he
faces the classic "principal's problem" in building his institution: how to choose
agents, and how to structure his relationship to them, in such a way that they are
most likely to take actions that enhance his own capacity for leadership."8
Figuring out how to organize people productively is a complicated business.
It is crucial to recognize, however, that presidents' unchallenged authority within
their own realm gives them a great advantage in minimizing the "agency losses"
that plague most control relationships in politics. They can choose people who
not only have the right kind of training and skills to do their jobs well, but who
also, by virtue of ideology, partisanship, and loyalty, can be expected to promote
the president's interests as they go about their tasks. The presidency is not just
a hierarchy of employees but, more than perhaps any other major political
institution, a team.39
This simplifies the president's job as well as his organization. In most agency
relationships, structures proliferate in order to minimize the agency losses
associated with opportunism, conflict of interest, and asymmetric information.
Rules, incentive schemes, monitoring, and other devices are necessary to control
agents who cannot be counted upon to do the right thing. To the extent that
personnel choices produce a genuine team, however, opportunism and conflict

which happens to be the standard line these days among positive theorists, is stressed here. See Moe,
supra note 11.
37. PRESIDENT'S
COMMrITEE
ON
ADMINISTRATIVE
MANAGEMENT,
ADMINISTRATIVE
MANAGEMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 5 (1937).
38. JOHN W, PRATT & RICHARD J. ZECKHAUSER, PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS 2-4 (1985).

39.

See, e.g., RICHARD NATHAN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRESIDENCY (1983). This should not be

interpreted in absolute terms. There are obviously different interests and ideologies at work among the
various members of each presidency, and power struggles are not uncommon. The president, however,
is the focal point that unites all players. They may struggle to gain his attention and influence his
decisions, but they are all expected, at the risk of their jobs, to be good, responsible team members.

Page 1: Spring 19941

POLITICS OF STRUCrURE

of interest are greatly reduced, and much of the bureaucratic apparatus designed
to reduce agent shirking can be dispensed with. Still, the often politically
sensitive decisions these agents make are important to the president, and
mistakes can be very costly. So some bureaucracy is still necessary. But its
purpose is to mitigate the problems faced by teams-by promoting coordination,
information-sharing, and applications of suitable expertise among individuals who
share the same mission of furthering the president's interests, but may not know
how to achieve it or how to function productively as a group.
All this applies with most force to what we might think of as the "purely
presidential" part of the institutional presidency. This part provides support
services for the president and includes his closest advisers, the personnel office,
the media office, the congressional liaison office, and units for outreach to
interest groups. These are clearly internal to the presidential hierarchy and
subject to his complete authority. But the boundaries of the institutional
presidency are unclear at the margins, more so than those of Congress, because
the president has rationally extended his own institution to try to control the farflung federal bureaucracy-which is not solely under his authority. This
extension of the presidency reaches beyond the president's own special realm.
The problems he faces there, as well as the structures needed to deal with them,
are different.'
Presidential control of the bureaucracy involves a two-step agency relationship. The first step is purely presidential: the president delegates the task to his
own agents, whom he must try to control. Although he cannot do so perfectly,
this is the easy part. It is the second step, in which the president's agents try to
control the bureaucracy, that produces real trouble. Opportunism, conflict of
interest, and asymmetric information-the bases of willful noncompliance-are
rampant at this lower level. The surface reason is that each agency has its own
mission, expertise, clientele, linkages with congressional committees, and methods
of operation. They do not want to be controlled by the president. The deeper
reason is that much of this is built in, because legislators and groups design it to
be that way.
The president can employ his residual decision rights as chief executive to
mitigate these problems and gain more control for himself. Two institutional
strategies stand out: he can "politicize" and he can "centralize."4 1 Although
dealing with agencies designed and overseen by Congress, he is fully capable of
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implementing these two strategies on his own authority to target the foundations
of agency noncompliance.
Presidents politicize by using their appointment authority to place loyal,
ideologically compatible people in pivotal positions in the bureaus, the
departments, and, of course, the OMB and other presidential agencies whose job
it is to exercise control. This is a strategy of imperialism, extending the reach of
the presidential team by infiltrating alien territory. The idea is to ensure that
important bureaucratic decisions are made, or at least overseen and monitored,
by presidential agents.
The aggressive use of presidential appointment power-nicely augmented by
the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, which allows the president to choose his
own team of high-level civil servants in the Senior Executive Service ("SES")goes a long way toward mitigating the most severe problems of opportunism and
conflict of interest that prompt agencies willfully to resist presidential control.
In addition, the appointment power attacks the problem of asymmetric
information by providing the presidential team with a pipeline into the private
information that agencies might otherwise use to evade control, especially if
appointees bring expertise or experience to their jobs (which is virtually
guaranteed for team members within the Senior Executive Service). Thus,
appointment mitigates not only the will to resist but also the means, for expertise
and other types of private information are perhaps the most crucial sources of
agency power.4 2
The appointment power does part of the job, but serious problems remain.
Political appointees can never know what career bureaucrats know; they will
always be at a disadvantage. Moreover, precisely because they are working in
the agencies and need the support of agency personnel to do their jobs well,
appointees are under pressure to become advocates for the parochial interests
of their agencies. As long as effective decisionmaking authority rests with the
agencies themselves, then, presidents will have a difficult time gaining control
through an appointments strategy alone. And because the parceling out of
authority in this manner means that decisions will be decentralized and
fragmented, presidents cannot simply rely on appointments to create the kind of
coherent, coordinated policy control they need.
This is where the centralization strategy comes in. Instead of infiltrating the
agencies to ensure they make the right kinds of decisions out on the periphery,
presidents can use structure to shift the locus of effective decisionmaking
authority to the center. One basic way they can do this, as chief executives, is
by imposing managerial rules that constrain agency behavior, and by building
presidential organizations, such as the Office of Management and Budget, to help
make and enforce these rules. The rules may vary from the most mundane
procedures for budget submissions and legislative clearance to the bolder, more
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controversial requirements for regulatory review. All such rules have the effects
of limiting agency discretion and shifting decisionmaking power to the president.
More generally, presidents can move toward coherent central control by
setting up their own policymaking structures inside the White House, incorporating people of their own choosing from the departments, the agencies, and the
Executive Office, and pulling salient issues of public policy into the presidency
for debate and resolution. In foreign policy the major centralizing institution is
the National Security Council ("NSC"). The president clearly has strong reasons
for not wanting the State Department, the Defense Department, and other
agencies to make their own foreign policy decisions. Incorporating them into a
central structure run by his own people, he can attempt to make foreign policy
truly presidential by hearing their views, enlisting their expertise, coordinating
their contributions, and directing policy toward presidential ends.43
In domestic policy, much the same applies. Although there is no statutory
agency like the NSC to put a formal stamp on their efforts, all modem presidents
have rightly feared becoming captives of the bureaus and departments, and, they
have incrementally moved toward the development of White House structures
that presidentialize major policy issues." Nixon's Domestic Council and
Reagan's cabinet councils are two examples. As structures of presidential
control, these are the functional equivalents of the NSC.
Even in combination, of course, politicization and centralization cannot give
the president the control he needs for effective leadership. The bureaucracy
does not want to be controlled, is structured to prevent it, and has ample
resources to resist. Moreover, even if he could, the president would not want to
push these strategies to an extreme. His leadership obviously benefits from the
expertise, experience, and continued operation of public agencies, and he cannot
totally circumvent them, infiltrate them, or deny them discretion without
undermining their essential role in governance-and his own capacity for
leadership. 5
The continuing problem for presidents, though, is that they have too little
control, not too much, and they need to build an institution that helps them do
a better job of overcoming the tremendous obstacles to leadership the system

places in their way. This is what the presidential team, the various presidential
organizations, and the strategies of politicization and centralization are all about,
and it is what the institutional presidency as a whole is all about. This is how
presidents fight back: with structures that enhance their power.
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A. The Presidential Advantage: Discretion and Unilateral Power
At the heart of the U.S. system is a basic institutional tension between the
president and Congress. Legislators and groups, motivated by parochial
concerns, routinely go about the piecemeal construction of a bureaucracy buried
in formalism, insulated from effective control, and ill-designed for its tasks.
Presidents, motivated to lead, find this unacceptable. They take aggressive
action to presidentialize the system's institutional makeup by modifying the
"congressional bureaucracy," developing their own institutions, and putting them
to use. The other players resist, the president counters, and the cycle continues.
The central dynamic of the U.S. institutional system comes from this tension
between presidents who seek control and the legislative and group players who
want to carve out their own small pieces of turf.
The U.S. system has always been fragmented and decentralized. The kind
of institutions favored by legislators and groups fit nicely with the traditional
character of the system. What is new and different in the modern period is the
presidency and, in particular, the public expectations that drive all modern
presidents to seek leadership and control. Presidents are the ones who are out
of step, pushing for new institutional arrangements that fly in the face of
traditional practice and parochialism. They are the ones, as a consequence, who
represent the real driving force for change in the U.S. institutional system.
Legislators and groups are essentially protectors of the institutional status quo.
Inevitably, given separation of powers, the protectors of the status quo are
well equipped to block most attempts at change. Even so, presidents hold
pivotal advantages that allow them to propel the system, however haltingly and
episodically, along a presidential trajectory.
The president is greatly advantaged by his position as chief executive, which
gives him the right to make unilateral decisions about structure and policy. If
he wants to develop his own institution, review or reverse agency decisions,
coordinate agency actions, make changes in agency leadership, or otherwise
impose his views on government, he can simply proceed-and it is up to
Congress (and the courts) to react. For reasons discussed below, Congress often
finds this difficult or impossible to do. And the president wins by default. The
ability to win by default is a cornerstone of the presidential advantage.
Why does the president have these powers of unilateral action? Part of the
answer is constitutional. Rather than spelling out his authority as chief executive
in great detail-a strategy favored by those among the Founders, such as
Madison, who were most concerned with limiting the executive-the Constitution
remains largely silent on the nature and extent of presidential authority,
especially in domestic affairs. It broadly endows the president with "the
executive power" and gives him responsibility to "take care that the laws be
faithfully executed," but says little else.'
This ambiguity, as Richard Pious
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notes, "provided the opportunity for the exercise of a residuum of unenumerated
power."'47 Proponents of a strong executive, who won out on the ambiguous
language, were well aware of that.
The question of what the president's formal powers really are, or ought to be,
will always be a subject of controversy among legal scholars. But two
observations seem reasonably clear. First, if presidents are to perform their
duties effectively under the Constitution, they must be (and in practice are)
regarded as having certain legal prerogatives that allow them to do what
executives do: manage, coordinate, staff, collect information, plan, and reconcile
conflicting values. This is what it means, in practice, to have the "executive
power. '
Second, although the content of these prerogative powers is itself
unclear, presidents have been aggressive in pushing an expansive interpretation:
rushing into grey areas of the law, asserting their rights, and exercising
them-whether or not other actors, particularly those in Congress, happen to
agree.49
The courts have the authority to resolve ambiguities about the president's
proper constitutional role, but they have not chosen to exercise it. Certain
contours of presidential power have been clarified by major court decisions-on
the removal power, for instance, and executive privilege-and justices have
sometimes offered their views on the president's implied or inherent powers as
chief executive.5" The political reality, however, is that presidents have largely
defined their own constitutional role thus far by pushing out the boundaries of
their prerogatives.
There is nothing that Congress can do to eliminate the president's executive
power. He is not Congress's agent. He has his own constitutional role to play
and his own constitutional powers to exercise, powers that are not delegated to
him by Congress and cannot be taken away. Any notion that Congress makes
the laws and that the president's job is simply to execute them-to follow orders,
in effect-overlooks the essence of separation of powers. The president is an
authority in his own right, coequal to Congress and not subordinate to it.
Precisely because the president is chief executive, however, what he can and
cannot do is also shaped by the goals and requirements of the statutory laws he
is charged with executing. And Congress has the right to be as specific as it
wants in designing these laws, as well as the agencies that administer them. If
it so likes, it can specify policy and structure in enough detail to narrow agency
discretion considerably, and thereby the scope for presidential control. It can
also impose requirements that explicitly qualify and limit how presidents may use
their prerogative powers, as it has done, for instance, in protecting members of
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independent commissions from removal and in mandating civil service
protections.5 1

Yet these sorts of restrictions cannot ultimately contain presidential power.
Presidents are powerful players in the legislative process, and they will fight for
statutes that give them as much discretion as possible. In addition to this,
however, the legislative authors of statutes cannot eliminate all discretion in their
delegations to bureaucracies and presidents anyway, and they would not want to
even if they could. Their concern, politics aside, is still the effective provision
of benefits to constituents. For problems of even moderate complexity,
especially in an ever-changing world, this concern requires placing most aspects
of policy and organization in the hands of professionals and allowing them to use
their own expert judgment in fleshing out the details.
The best legislators can do is to write statutory analogues to "incomplete contracts"-arrangements that, however detailed, do not specify the decisions that
must be made under all present and future contingencies-and then embed them
in "governing structures" that specify who gets to participate in discretionary
decisions, what procedures must be followed in making them, and how these
decisions can be reviewed or appealed.52 But these governing structures are
designed subject to presidential veto, and thus with sensitivity to presidential
concerns. And once they are set up, it is the president and the agencies who do
the governing, not the Congress. Short of new legislation, Congress can only
resort to oversight from the outside. The president is chief executive, and the
ball is in his court.
Thus, while legislators and groups may try to protect their agencies by
burying them in rules and regulations, a good deal of discretion must remain, and
presidents cannot readily be stopped from turning it to their own advantage.
They are centrally and supremely positioned in the executive, they have great
flexibility to act, they have a vast array of powers and mechanisms at their
disposal-not to mention informal means of persuasion and influence-and they,
not Congress, are the ones who are ultimately responsible for day-to-day
governance. Even when Congress directly limits presidential prerogatives (such
as the removal power), presidents have the flexibility to simply shift over to
other means of control.
In part, the problem Congress faces is analogous to the classic problem a
board of directors faces in trying to control management in a private firm."
The board, representing owners, tries to impose a governing structure to ensure
that management will behave in the owners' best interests. But managers have
their own interests at heart, and expertise and day-to-day control of operations
allows them to engage in a measure of shirking behavior. Much the same is true
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for Congress and the president. However much Congress tries to structure
things, the president can use his own institution's-and through it, the
agencies'-informational and operational advantages to engineer outcomes that
promote presidential, rather than congressional, objectives. Although charged
with "faithfully" executing the laws, the president has a very substantial capacity
to shirk.
But the corporate analogy is not quite on target. The problem owners face
is that they cannot control their agents, who are managers that they hire and
have authority over. Owners have control problems even though their authority
is supreme. Congress's problem is far more severe. The president possesses all
the resources for shirking that the corporate manager does, but his position is far
stronger, because he is not Congress's agent in the scheme of government. He
is an authority in his own right. Congress does not hire him, it cannot fire him,
and it cannot structure his powers and incentives in any way it might like. Yet
it is forced to entrust the execution of the laws to his hands. From a control
standpoint, this is a nightmare come true. And it is not a shirking problem. It
is an authority problem in which, when the president goes his own way, he is not
really shirking at all.
It is also important to recognize that, although Congress can try to limit
presidential prerogatives through statute, the president is greatly empowered
through statutory law whether Congress intends it or not. Some grants of power
to the president are explicit, as, for example, in the negotiation of tariffs and the
oversight of mergers in the foreign trade field. But the most far-reaching
additions to presidential power are implicit. When new statutes are passed,
almost whatever they are, they increase the president's total responsibilities and
give him a formal basis for extending his authoritative reach into new realms.
At the same time, they add to the total discretion available for presidential
control, as well as to the resources contained within the executive.
While it may seem that the proliferation of statutes over time would tie the
president up in knots as he pursues the execution of each one, the aggregate
impact is liberating. For the president, as chief executive, is responsible for all
the laws, and inevitably the laws turn out to be interdependent and conflicting
in ways that the individual statutes themselves do not recognize. As would be
true of any executive, the president's proper role is to rise above a myopic focus
on each statute in isolation, to coordinate policies by taking account of their
interdependence, and to resolve statutory conflicts by balancing their competing
requirements. All of this affords the president substantial discretion to impose
his own priorities on government. 54
Regulatory review is but one instance of this. Since the Nixon years, all
presidents have insisted on reviewing the proposed rules of various regulatory
agencies, and their add-on structures and criteria have caused a number of

54. See generally PIous, supra note 36; Bruff, supra note 39, at 540-46; Bruff, supra note 48, at 46162; Cutler, supra note 48, at 835-39.
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important rules to be delayed, modified, or shelved.55 Agencies and their
legislative and group supporters have complained loudly that this review process
prevents the agencies from single-mindedly pursuing their mandates. And they
are right. Yet presidents are responsible not just for these particular statutes, but
for all statutes, including those directing them to lower inflation and unemployment, promote economic growth, conserve energy, and otherwise enhance the
economic well-being of the nation. Thus, presidents have a statutory (as well as
a constitutional) basis for asserting their coordinating-and-balancing prerogatives
in bringing these other values to bear on the regulatory agencies. And in
political practice, of course, this means that they have a legal argument for
imposing presidential priorities and expanding the scope of their own discretionary action. The greater the proliferation of congressional legislation over the
years, the greater the president's opportunities to find just this sort of conflict
and interdependence-and to assert control.
B. The Presidential Advantage: Congress's Collective Action Problems
Another major source of presidential advantage deserves equal emphasis.
The president is a unitary actor who sits alone atop his own institution. What
he says goes. Congress is a collective institution that can make decisions only
through the laborious aggregation of member preferences. As such, it suffers
from serious collective action problems that the president not only avoids, but
can exploit.
This crucial fact of political life is too often overlooked. There is a tendency
among scholars and journalists to reify the Congress, to treat it as though it is an
institutional actor like the president, and to analyze their institutional conflicts
accordingly. The president and Congress are portrayed as fighting it out, head
to head, over matters of institutional power and prerogative. Each is seen as
defending and promoting its own institutional interests. The president wants
power, Congress wants power, and they struggle for advantage.
This misconstrues things. Congress is made up of hundreds of members, each
a political entrepreneur in her own right, each dedicated to her own reelection,
and thus to serving her own district or state. While all have a common stake in
the institutional power of Congress, this is a collective good that, for well-known
reasons, can only weakly motivate their behavior.56 They are trapped in a
prisoner's dilemma: while all might benefit if they could cooperate in defending
or advancing Congress's power, there are strong incentives for each to free-ride
if support for the collective good is politically costly to them as individuals. Just
as individual citizens, absent taxation, would not voluntarily pay their respective
shares of national defense costs, so individual legislators will not flout the
interests of their constituencies if that is the price of protecting congressional
power. Were a legislator offered a dam, a Veteran's Administration hospital, or

55. See, e.g., Robert V. Percival, Checks Without Balance: Executive Office Oversight of the
Environmental ProtectionAgency, 54 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 128-55 (Autumn 1991).
56. MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF CoLLEcnvE ACTION (1971).
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a new highway to vote for a bill that, among other things, happens to reduce
Congress's power somewhat relative to the president's, there would be little
mystery as to where the stronger incentives lie.
The internal organization of Congress, especially its party leadership, imposes
a modicum of order and authority on member behavior and gives the institution
a certain capacity to guard its power. But disabling problems still run rampant,
and they are built-in. Party leaders are notoriously weak, and they are weak
because their "followers" want them to be. Good leadership means promoting
the reelection prospects of members by decentralizing authority, expanding their
serve special interests, and giving them the freedom to vote their
opportunities to
57
constituencies.
Presidents are not hobbled by these collective action problems and, supreme
within their institution, can simply make authoritative decisions about what is
best. While their interests as individuals may sometimes conflict with those of
the presidency as an institution-for instance, if their needs for responsiveness
and loyalty undercut the presidency's long-term capacity for expertise and
competence 58 -their drive for leadership almost always motivates them to
promote the power of their institution. Thus, not only is the presidency a unitary
institution, but there is also substantial congruence between the president's
individual interests and the interests of the institution.
This sets up a basic imbalance. Presidents have both the will and the
capacity to promote the power of their own institution, whereas individual
legislators have neither, and cannot be expected to promote the power of
Congress as a whole in any coherent or forceful way. This means that presidents
will behave imperialistically and opportunistically, but that Congress will not do
the same in formulating an offensive of its own, and indeed will not even be able
to mount a consistently effective defense against presidential encroachment.
Congress's situation is all the worse because its collective action problems do
more than disable its will and capacity for action. They also allow presidents to
manipulate legislative behavior to their own advantage, getting members to
support or at least acquiesce to the growth of presidential power. One basis for
this has already been well established by political scientists:59 in any majorityrule insitution with diverse members, so many different majority coalitions are
possible that, given the right manipulation of the agenda, outcomes can be
engineered to allow virtually any alternative to win against any other. Put more
simply, an agenda-setter can take advantage of the collective action problems
inherent in majority-rule to get her own way. She can find a majority for her
own most preferred outcome.
Presidents have at least two important kinds of agenda power. First,
precisely because Congress is so fragmented, presidentially initiated legislation
57. MAYHEW, supra note 19.
58. Helco, supra note 45.
59. See generally Richard D. McKelvey, Intransitivities in MultidimensionalVoting: Models and
Some Implicationsfor Agenda Control, 12 J. ECON. THEORY 472 (1976).
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is the single most coherent political force in setting the legislative agenda. The
issues Congress deals with are fundamentally shaped each year by the issues
presidents decide will be salient.' Second, presidents set Congress's agenda
when they or their appointees in the bureaucracy take unilateral action to shift
the status quo-for instance, by changing the direction of an agency's policy.
This happens all the time, and Congress is simply forced to react or acquiesce.
In either case, presidents can choose their positions strategically, with an eye to
the various majorities in Congress, and engineer outcomes more beneficial to the
presidency than they could if dealing with a unified opponent.6
Their leverage is greatly enhanced by the maze of obstacles that stand in the
way of congressional decisionmaking. Bills must pass through subcommittees,
committees, and floors in each house; they must be endorsed in identical form
by both; and they are threatened along the way by rules committees, filibusters,
holds, and other roadblocks. All are veto points, all have to be overcome if
Congress is to act, and presidents need success with only one to ensure the status
quo.
Positive theorists tend to understate the capacity of presidents (and others)
to prevent congressional action. Their models of legislative voting invariably
leave out many of the veto points. They fail to treat committees and subcommittees as distinct decision arenas, for instance, and they ignore the opportunities
for filibusters and holds on legislation in the Senate. Simplifying these factors
away may be helpful for modeling purposes, but it glosses over the staggering
number of obstacles that must be overcome for any legislation to emerge,
suggesting it is much easier to get action than in fact it is.62
More generally, these models assume that legislative voting is costless, and
thus entirely determined by the various players' ideal points. In a literature that
prides itself on recognizing the pervasive consequences of transaction costs, this
is a great oddity. The transaction costs of moving a bill through the entire
legislative process are enormous. Not only must coalitions be formed among
hundreds of legislators across two houses and a variety of committees and
subcommittees, calling for intricate coordination, persuasion, trades, and
promises, but, given scarce time and resources, members must also be convinced
that any particular issue is more deserving than hundreds or thousands of others
that are always competing for a place on the legislative agenda. Party leaders
and committee chairs can help reduce some of these costs through their
centralizing roles (although what they do in the process, of course, is to eliminate
most bills from contention, all of them with eager sponsors). But the whole
process of generating congressional outcomes is unavoidably costly anyway. And
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because it is, we cannot predict outcomes based on the ideal points of the players
alone. The best prediction is that, for most issues most of the time, there will be
no affirmative action on the part of Congress at all. The ideal points may
logically support a given outcome, but in reality nothing will happen.
When presidents are able to use prerogative powers and discretion to shift
the status quo, what they most want from Congress is no formal response at
all-which is what they are likely to get. This would be so in any event, given
the multiple veto points and high transaction costs that plague congressional
choice. But it is especially likely when presidents and their institutional agents
weigh into the legislative process on their own behalf: dangling rewards,
threatening sanctions, directing the troops, and unsticking legislative deals with
side payments.63 Presidents are especially well situated and endowed with
political resources to do this. And again, it is fairly easy to block.
Whether presidents are trying to block or to push for legislation, the
motivational asymmetry at work adds mightily to their cause. We referred to
this above, but it is important enough to need underlining. Presidents are
strongly motivated to develop an institutional capacity for controlling government as a whole, and, when structural issues are in question, they tend to take
the larger view: how do these structures contribute to the creation of a
presidential system of control? Legislators are driven by localism and special
interests, and they are little motivated by these sorts of system concerns. This
basic motivational asymmetry has a great deal to do with what presidents are
able to accomplish in their attempts to block or steer congressional outcomes.
On issues affecting the institutional balance of power, presidents care
intensely about securing changes that promote their institutional power, while
legislators typically do not. They are unlikely to oppose incremental increases
in the relative power of presidents unless the issue in question directly harms the
special interests in their clientele; and, if presidents play their cards right, this can
often be avoided. On the other hand, legislators are generally unwilling to do
what is necessary to develop Congress's own capacity for strong institutional
action. For not only does it often require that they put constituency concerns
aside for the common good, which they have strong incentives not to do, but it
also tends to call for more centralized control for party leaders and less
autonomy for individual legislators, which they find distinctly unattractive.
When institutional issues are at stake in legislative voting, then, presidents
have a motivational advantage. They care more. This asymmetry means that
they will invest more of their political clout in getting what they want. It also
means that the situation is ripe for trade. Legislators may fill the air with
rhetoric about the dangers of presidential power, but their weak individual stakes
allow them to be bought off with the kinds of particularistic benefits and
sanctions that they really do care intensely about. This does not imply that
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presidents can perform magic. If what they want requires affirmative congressional action, they face many obstacles and a low probability of success. But
their chances are still much better than they would otherwise be, absent the
motivational asymmetry. And if all they want to do is block, which is often all
they need, then the asymmetry can work wonders in cementing presidential faits
accompli.
The weight of all these factors, taken together, points to a decided
presidential advantage in the battle for institutional power. The president is a
unitary decisionmaker; he can take unilateral action in imposing his own
structures; his individual interests are largely congruent with the institutional
interests of the presidency; and he is dedicated to gaining control over
government. Congress is hobbled by collective action problems, vulnerable to
agenda manipulation by the president, and populated by individuals whose
interests diverge substantially from those of the institution. The result is an
imbalance in the dynamic of institutional change, yielding an uneven but
relentless shift toward a more presidential system.
Inherent in this trajectory is a ratchet effect: when presidents gain new
ground, they will not give it back. They want control, and every president will
protect not only what he has won, but what all past presidents have won.
Sometimes, of course, the tides of politics may move against them. Congress
may on rare occasions overcome its congenital incapacities and strike a blow for
greater congressional control, as it did, for instance, in the War Powers Act'
(which presidents have largely ignored). But these are the exceptions. Congress
will usually be incapable of winning back all the ground it has lost.
The presidential advantage does not mean that presidents are destined to
take over. Separation of powers creates legal impediments to extreme shifts in
the institutional balance. And in the ongoing politics of structural choice, the
growth of presidential control represents an increasing threat to parochial
interests and gives them stronger incentives to invest in political opposition. The
most reasonable expectation is for some sort of equilibrium to be reached in
future years, an equilibrium more presidential than we have now, but still a far
cry from what presidents might like.
IV
THE PRESIDENTIAL QUEST FOR POWER:

THREE CASES

To illustrate this argument about the presidential advantage, we now turn to
three important cases in recent institutional politics. Each involves presidential
attempts to expand their own powers at the expense of Congress.
The first case explores the politics of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 6
in which President Carter sought to engineer a significant increase in presidential
control over federal employees, and asks how Congress responded. The second
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looks at congressional oversight and funding of the institutional presidency, and
asks how effectively Congress has used its own powers to prevent presidents
from increasing theirs. The third spotlights regulatory review, in which
presidents have imposed their own rules and priorities on agency decisionmaking,
and asks what Congress has done to stop it.
A. Civil Service Reform
Civil Service is obviously a major impediment to presidential leadership, but
until Jimmy Carter no modern president had invested much in trying to reform
the system. Civil service reform had been included in broader reorganization
packages, notably under Roosevelt (via the Brownlow Committee) and
Eisenhower (via the Second Hoover Commission), but it had never been a high
priority on its own. 6 This is hardly surprising. Genuine reform calls for new
legislation of the first magnitude, which is difficult, expensive, and timeconsuming to achieve. With so many other ways to enhance their power through
unilateral action, presidents had little incentive to pursue it.
Carter's situation was different from that of his predecessors. He oversaw a
government that was much bigger, more bureaucratic, and more expensive than
theirs. By the mid-1970s, in an atmosphere of stagflation and energy shortages,
U.S. citizens were fed up. Strong anti-government, anti-tax sentiments swelled
within the electorate, and politicians-Jimmy Carter most prominent among
them-responded with pledges of reform.6 7
It was easy to portray civil service reform as part of this broad movement for
better, more effective government. But for Carter it was also much more than
that. It was a way to make the civil service system an arm of the presidency, and
thus to enhance the president's capacity to control the bureaucracy. The kind
of reform he had in mind amounted to nothing less than a clear shift in the
balance of institutional power.
By the early spring of 1978, barely a year after assuming office, Carter placed
a comprehensive proposal for civil service reform before Congress. Together
with Alan Campbell, his chair of the existing Civil Service Commission, he
turned loose a small army of White House staffers, cabinet members, and OMB
officials to mobilize support within Congress.'
The proposed legislation involved five major changes in the federal personnel
system69:
(1) It would divide the Civil Service Commission, long a nonpartisan
independent agency, into two parts. One, the Office of Personnel Management
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("OPM"), would be headed by a single presidential appointee and would set
personnel policies for federal employees. The other, the Merit Systems
Protection Board ("MSPB"), would be an adjudicatory agency for handling
appeals and grievances.
(2) It would create a Senior Executive Service, a flexible corps of high-level
administrators (about 9,200 in number) who could be moved from job to job and
who would qualify for substantial merit pay.
(3) It would get away from automatic pay raises for supervisors and
managers, increasing reliance on performance evaluations and merit pay.
(4) It would substantially curtail veterans' preferences, which, since World
War I, had given them priority for federal jobs.
(5) It would codify arrangements for unionization and collective bargaining
and place responsibility with a new agency, the Federal Labor Relations
Authority.
There was nothing here to fool legislators into believing this was just a
statesmanlike attempt to achieve good government. The OPM would be an arm
of the presidency and would be granted much more discretion than the old Civil
Service Commission, discretion that could obviously be turned to presidential
advantage. There would be a large corps of senior executives-whose personal
views, loyalties, and partisanship are easily identified-that the OPM could
allocate at its discretion across key agency jobs. And these executives, as well
as other managers within the Civil Service, would be subject to performance
evaluations and merit pay, which would inevitably be determined by the
discretionary judgment of the president's people within the OPM and the
agencies.
Congress responded just as we would expect. Legislators did not care much
about the balance of power issue and, with a few exceptions, did not oppose this
shift in authority and discretion to the president. Virtually all the political
controversy was stimulated by the intense opposition of special interest
groups-labor unions and veterans groups-to the provisions of the Act that
specifically affected them.7" The legislators who led the battle against civil
service reform had little or no concern for the larger institutional issues. They
were responding to powerful groups, who obviously did not care about these
issues either. It was group politics as usual.
The committees with primary jurisdiction were the Senate Government
Affairs Committee and the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee. The
Senate Committee is not tied to any particular set of interest groups because its
mandate is to oversee government organization generally and because it attracts
Senators from various constituencies. These Senators, like all politicians during
the late 1970s, knew that supporting "reform" would have electoral advantages.
And there were few direct impacts on their constituencies to worry about.
Meantime, Carter was pushing hard, using the resources at his disposal to win
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them over. The result was almost total support, among both Democrats and
Republicans, for the core of the president's bill.
Not even this committee, however, was immune to group influence. Well
aware of the broadly based power of veterans groups within Congress, its
members feared a bloody floor fight that could derail the whole bill. 71 In
addition, they knew that there were veterans in their own districts who were
numerous, organized, and active. The committee ended up reporting a bill that
substantially weakened the offensive provision about veterans, but otherwise
preserved what the president wanted.7 2
On the Senate floor, two Republicans, Charles Mathias of Maryland and Ted
Stevens of Alaska, who had opposed the bill in committee, argued against the
dangers of politicization of the civil service by the president. This was the only
serious opposition to the bill that was couched in institutional rather than
interest-group terms.7 3 They were appeased, however, with minor amendments
that left the essence of the bill unchanged. The veteran's provision, too, was
slightly amended. The amended bill was approved by the entire Senate by a
vote of 87 to I,' hardly an indication that Senators were staying up nights
worrying about the balance of institutional power.
In the House, there was more of a political struggle-but not over institutional issues. The House Post Office and Civil Service Committee was a friendly
place for interest groups. Because of its jurisdiction, it was a high-priority setting
for the federal employees unions and the politicians who sought to serve them.
The unions were particularly strong on this committee, and they were not happy
with this Act.75
Initially, the president had attempted to appease them by including in his bill
a provision codifying aspects of labor relations and creating the Federal Labor
Relations Administration ("FLRA"). But the unions found this too weak to
compensate for the Act's threatening expansions of executive discretion and
merit pay, which directly eroded the kinds of rule-based protections unions
consistently demand for their members.
The federal employees unions did not have enough support to torpedo the
bill, but they were strong enough to cause trouble. Their fallback was to have
William Clay, a Democrat from Missouri, attach an amendment that liberalized
existing Hatch Act limitations on federal employee political activities. This left
the remaining provisions unaffected, but it was something the unions desperately
wanted. A similar provision had passed in the House the year before, and
presumably would do so again. But it was vehemently opposed by Republicans,
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who were generally quite supportive of Carter's civil service reform bill; and they
launched a variety of strategic maneuvers of their own, leading to a complicated
political battle whose intricacies can only be appreciated by seasoned parliamen76
tarians.
In the end, the Clay Amendment was dropped. Labor did attach an
amendment limiting the SES to a small pilot program, but Republicans allowed
this, knowing it would die later at the conference committee stage. More
concretely, labor also succeeded in strengthening the provision on collective
bargaining. Veterans left their mark, too: the House accepted the Senate's
wording, and thus retained most veteran's preferences. 77 The resulting bill
passed the House floor on a vote of 385 to 10.78 Again, none of this had
anything to do with general concerns about the balance of power. Once the
groups were satisfied, the legislators were willing to go along.
The bill coming out of the conference committee was almost exactly what
President Carter had requested: a bill radically transforming the civil service
system and granting him substantial new discretion and power.79
With
Republican support, the committee restored the full SES program. However, to
mollify labor Democrats, it tacked on a two-house legislative veto to the SES
provision.' Aside from this, and, of course, the victory by veterans, the bill
81
passed both houses without controversy.
While all this was happening, a revealing decision was being made along a
separate track. The president had sought most of his changes via new legislation,
but he had asked for authority to divide the Civil Service Commission into two
parts, the OPM and the MSPB, through a "reorganization plan," which by law
2
would take effect unless vetoed by either the House or the Senate.
The reaction of legislators to this aspect of the proposal is especially telling
evidence of how they approach issues of institutional power, because this Carter
reorganization plan was an issue shorn of all special interest provisions. It simply
called for an up-or-down vote on whether the president should bring personnel
more fully under his control throughout the government. Did members of
Congress rise up to stop presidential imperialism? Hardly. The House voted 19
to 381 to defeat a resolution opposed to the president's plan, and the Senate did
not bother to vote3
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The bottom line is that the president cared a great deal about these issues of
institutional power, but members of Congress did not. If anything, they were
mildly supportive, due to the reformist sentiments among the public at the time.
The only political fireworks were supplied by the special interest groups directly
affected by this legislation: unions and veterans.
B. Congressional Oversight of the Presidency
Under the Constitution, Congress's powers are vague at the margins, just as
the president's powers are. While Congress has the right to make the laws, it is
unclear how far it might go in making laws that undermine the president's ability
to exercise his constitutional rights as chief president. Similarly, while Congress
has the power of the purse, it cannot be too draconian in denying funds to the
executive without making it impossible for him to carry out his proper duties.
Nonetheless, an aggressive Congress bent on protecting and promoting its
own power in the institutional system would do what presidents have done. It
would push its prerogatives to the limit and use every ambiguity to its own
advantage. If threatened, as it clearly has been, by the growing scope and reach
of the institutional presidency, Congress has the formal power to reduce funding,
withhold authorization, stifle appointments, and engage in aggressive oversight.
Indeed, it could take action to prevent the emergence of a powerful institutional
presidency in the first place. Presidents cannot build a powerful institution with
no money.
Yet Congress has done nothing of the sort. It has not only failed to act
aggressively in asserting its own powers. It has largely stood on the sidelines and
allowed presidents to do what they want in building their own institution in their
own way. The most comprehensive study of the topic is contained in John Hart's
The PresidentialBranch.' Hart sums it up this way:
Ever since the Executive Office of the President was established in 1939,
Congress has shown a marked reluctance to enforce, let alone strengthen, its
oversight of the presidential branch. Even the events of Watergate, which
helped to crystallize a great deal of criticism of the White House staff, did little
to increase enthusiasm for improving congressional oversight in this area. Those
efforts that were made came from a handful of legislators who were never able
to convince the majority of their colleagues on Capitol Hill to share their
concerns with the same intensity, and, today, the presidential branch remains
relatively immune from congressional scrutiny of any kind.85

Hart explains congressional inaction by pointing to the norm of comity, an
understanding among legislators that, in the interests of harmony between the
branches, presidents should be given latitude to develop their institution as they
see fit. Even if there is such a norm, however, deeper questions remain. Why
would legislators find comity compatible with their own interests? Why would
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they choose to leave the president alone when they have the power to go after
him?
The answer is rooted in Congress's collective action problems. Legislators
do not care much about incremental changes in the institutional presidency
unless their constituencies are directly affected. There are no group "fire
alarms" to prod them into action, and no clear electoral benefit to be gained by
opposing the president. In comparison, presidents always care intensely, and
they dedicate their resources to getting what they want.
The creation of the modern OMB, the workhorse and power center of the
institutional presidency, illustrates what Congress faces when presidents take the
offensive on purely institutional issues. The vehicle to create the OMB was
Richard Nixon's Reorganization Plan No. 2, which sought to transform the
Bureau of the Budget ("BOB") into a more powerful presidential agency.
Political appointees would replace career officials as heads of its operating
divisions; its functions in program management, coordination, and information
would be expanded; and all functions officially vested in the Bureau of the
Budget would be transferred to the president. The purpose of this plan was to
give the OMB greater managerial control over the government and to make the
OMB more responsive to the president.86 Legislators saw the plan for what it
was, but the institutional issues were insufficient to galvanize opposition. The
Senate never voted on a resolution of disapproval. The House did vote, but the
Nixon forces put together a coalition of Republicans and Southern Democrats
to win.'
Until the early 1970s, Congress had little success in constraining the
institutional presidency and showed little serious interest in doing so. It did try
to influence the kind of advice presidents received-by creating the Council of
Economic Advisors and the NSC, for instance, within the Executive Office. This
was futile as a control mechanism, however, because presidents can refuse to
take any advice they do not want. These units, like all others in the Executive
Office of the President ("EOP") over the years, quickly became creatures of the
sitting president. Each president was given a free hand within his own bailiwick
to organize, employ staff, assign jobs, and allocate resources.88 Congress was
largely in the dark, moreover, about exactly what presidents were doing. It did
not even know how many people were employed within the White House Office,
where they came from, which units paid their salaries, or what their jobs were.
It was funding all this, routinely and without question, but it literally did not
know what it was funding.89
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This changed in the early 1970s. By then, Richard Nixon had transformed
the BOB, dramatically increased the size and power of the White House staff,
and, in a variety of ways, antagonized the Democrats and their group supporters
in Congress; and a small number of legislators had begun to press for more
restrictive congressional oversight. Such isolated challenges would normally not
be much of a threat. But then Watergate hit with full force, generating a public
backlash against the "imperial presidency" and turning up the political heat.
More and more legislators found that attacking the presidency was a popular
thing to do.
The most notable struggles to come out of all this had their roots in a 1972
study by the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee, which, for the first
time, collected simple data documenting the growth of the institutional
presidency and its centralization of power in the White House. It decried these
developments and called for more intensive congressional efforts to amass
information on the presidency and restrict its development.'
The next year, John Dingel, a Democrat from Michigan, tried to unhinge the
presidential budget by revealing an amazing discovery: while Congress was
regularly appropriating money for some five hundred White House employees,
a 1948 statute still in effect only authorized six presidential assistants and eight
secretaries! The president mobilized enough support to gain authority and
funding for his troops in the short term, but a permanent solution in the law
obviously had to be found. His opponents, in the meantime, had been
accidentally empowered beyond their wildest dreams.91
Over the next several years, various legislators tried to engineer a bill that
would authorize White House staff and at the same time provide Congress with
better information and control. After a series of failed attempts, the House Post
Office Committee came up with a bill that, with much modification, passed into
law as the White House Personnel Authorization-Employment Act of 1978.'
The committee's original proposal was highly threatening to the president. It
imposed strict ceilings on total White House staff as well as on the number of
senior aides and executives; it also required presidents to submit an annual
report with detailed information on who works in the White House, what they
do, and who pays their salaries. As we would expect, however, these were toppriority issues for President Carter, and he maneuvered legislators into
supporting a friendly, largely symbolic final bill: one that authorized a large
White House staff and gutted the ceiling and reporting requirements.
Specifically, Carter got the House committee to remove its limit on total staff
and to accept an unconstraining ceiling on senior staff (which would allow a fully
staffed Carter White House to double its senior staff). Carter also got the
Senate, whose members cared even less about the issue, to gut the reporting
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requirements. Instead of detailed records on individual employees, the White
House would need to report only overall amounts spent on different types of
staff. As before, genuinely revealing information would remain hidden. In the
conference committee, the Senate won, and the fully gutted bill became law.
The president got his authorization. The Congress got next to nothing.93
To date this has been Congress's most coherent attempt to get a grip on the
institutional presidency, and the only major piece of legislation that has yet
emerged. But legislation is not Congress's only avenue of attack. There is
always its annually exercised power of the purse, which is clearly capable of
eviscerating the institutional presidency if used strategically.
Yet Congress has barely put the power of the purse to use. Prior to the
1970s, presidential budgets were barely scrutinized, and they typically passed
through both houses of Congress without any change. Presidents provided
Congress with virtually no information about the White House and its
operations, nor even about the details of EOP agencies. Congress simply
appropriated whatever funding presidents said was necessary. During the 1970s,
relations became more contentious, peaking during the Watergate period but
never entirely subsiding thereafter.'
Presidents must work a little harder for their money now. The Appropriations Committees demand more information, scrutinize it more carefully, and are
more critical than they used to be. But there is much less here than meets the
eye. Presidents continue to get virtually everything they request, legislative
rhetoric aside.95 And the information they do provide Congress is next to
useless for genuine control purposes. For the most part, their requests take the
form of lump sum amounts pertaining to whole EOP units, or broad categories
of employees or activities, with no information about the details of presidential
organization, programs, or staffing. Even these days, then, the presidency is still
treated with kid gloves, and Congress remains largely in the dark about what
happens inside it.
There are other aspects of legislative activity we might explore
here-Senatorial confirmation of appointments, for example-but we do not
have the space in this article to dwell on them. The story, however, would be
the same. Congress is only weakly capable of overseeing the institutional
presidency and preventing its development as a foundation of presidential power.
Congress clearly has the power, as an institution, to stop the presidency in its
tracks. But its members typically have little incentive to exercise it, and even
when they do, they are unlikely as a collective body to do it effectively,
especially in the face of a president dedicated to victory.
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V
REGULATORY REVIEW

Regulatory review is often spotlighted as an issue that captures the essence
of the institutional battle between the president and Congress. Presidents have
imposed new procedures on regulatory agencies in a sustained attempt, stretching
over twenty years, to gain control over agency rulemaking and assert presidential
priorities. During the same time, agencies and their legislative supporters have
vigorously protested, claiming the bureaucracy is being denied the autonomy and
discretion it needs to fulfill its legislative mandates. What could better reflect the
struggle for institutional power and advantage than this?
Yet regulatory review is quite different from most institutional issues in one
crucial respect: in practice, it has been carried out in the form of direct
presidential attacks on special interest groups, particularly environmental groups.
Thus, unlike the broad and general effects of civil service reform and congressional oversight of the institutional presidency, regulatory review's effects have been
concentrated on a few powerful targets. Not surprisingly, these targets have
fought back. As a result, legislators' normally weak incentives to protect
Congress's institutional interests against presidential onslaught have been
bolstered by the mobilization of powerful groups demanding legislative action.
Regulatory review is therefore an unusual-and, for Congress, quite fortunate-case in which interest groups actually pressure Congress to defend itself.'
The roots of the conflict go back to the early 1970s, when President Nixon
instituted the Quality of Life review program under the direction of the OMB.
The real target was the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), newly
created in 1970, which was devising anti-pollution rules that stood to cost
industry billions of dollars annually at a time when the national economy was
headed for trouble. Procedures were adopted requiring the EPA to submit its
rules for prepublication review so that other agencies could offer comments,
economic costs could be analyzed, conflicting views could be reconciled,
justifications could be required, and pressure could be applied to bring EPA
rules more in line with the President's programs.
During this period, however, new legislation deepened the President's
regulatory problems. "Seven new regulatory agencies had been created,
including the EPA, OSHA, and the Consumer Product Safety Commission.
Between 1970 and 1974, twenty-nine major regulatory statutes had been enacted
and the number of pages in the Federal Register had more than doubled from
20,036 to 42,422 per year."'
When Gerald Ford assumed office, he faced a
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rising tide of costly regulations, along with serious inflation and energy problems
that demanded action.
Ford responded with a more extensive system of regulatory review. The
Quality of Life program was continued. In addition, with the consent of an
inflation-concerned Congress, he set up the Council on Wage-Price Stability
("COWPS") in the EOP and ordered regulatory agencies to submit their
proposed rules, along with "inflation-impact statements," to COWPS for review.
The aim, again, was to use procedure, analysis, and informal pressure to force
agencies to consider economic costs and modify their rules accordingly.
When Democrat Jimmy Carter took office, environmental and labor groups
looked forward to a relaxation that would give their agencies a freer hand to
pursue their parochial mandates. Carter faced virtually the same problems that
Nixon and Ford had, and his response was distinctively presidential: he took
even more aggressive action along the same general path. Through Executive
Order 12,044, agencies were required to prepare "regulatory analyses" for all
regulations having major economic impacts by rigorously evaluating their cost
effectiveness and comparing them to alternatives.9" Proposed rules would then
be subject to review by the new Regulatory Analysis Review Group ("RARG"),
made up of representatives from seventeen executive agencies, led by the OMB,
COWPS, and the Council of Economic Advisors ("CEA"), and staffed by
economists committed to cost-benefit analysis.
It is clear from insider accounts that agencies-led, of course, by presidential
appointees-were indeed moderating some of their rules, sometimes against their
own best judgment. 9 The most affected groups and agencies, particularly the
environmentalists and the EPA, complained loudly about it from the start, and
members of Congress, led by Senator Edmund Muskie, obliged with sympathetic
hearings but little else. Near the end of the Carter regime, however, their
insistent pressure through Congress finally bore fruit. Carter pledged to go
easier on the EPA, and RARG backed off considerably.1"
This was the calm before the storm. In little more than a year, Ronald
Reagan took office and pushed regulatory review well beyond the bounds of his
predecessors. He began quickly, appointing a Task Force on Regulatory Relief
(chaired by Vice-President Bush), which promptly suspended almost two-hundred
pending regulations and prepared a list of current regulations to be targeted for
review." 1 Reagan followed up with Executive Order 12,291, which brought
agencies under presidential control as never before."°
Under this most recent order, agencies were required to submit all proposed
rules to the OMB's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs ("OIRA") for
pre-publication review, accompanied by rigorous cost-benefit analysis and
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evaluations of alternatives. Unlike the past, the OMB allowed agencies to issue
rules only when the benefits could be shown to exceed the costs, and required
them to choose among alternatives in such a way as to maximize the net benefits
to society. Moreover, the OMB now asserted the right to delay proposed rules
indefinitely during review." 3
There is little doubt that, in terms of both the substance and timing of rules,
the Reagan scheme of regulatory review imposed substantial constraints on the
EPA, OSHA, and other regulatory agenciesY°4
Environmental groups,
especially, were furious and launched all-out attempts in Congress to break the
hold of regulatory review. Pressure had been building for over ten years, as
frustration with past presidents prompted demands for a congressional counter
attack. But now, with the Reagan agenda so bold, the groups were pulling out
the stops.
How did Congress respond? It did not take on the President directly in an
all-out assault-say, through major legislation declaring Executive Order 12,291
null and void. Its approach was piecemeal and fragmented, and it generated just
what we would expect from a group-dominated institution: special-interest
legislation-for example, the 1982 amendments to the Endangered Species
Act,1 5 the 1984 amendments to the Hazardous and Solid Waste Act,1" and
the 1986 Superfund amendments°7-that, through countless new restrictions,
further narrowed the discretion of the EPA, hobbled it with even more
cumbersome and unworkable administrative burdens and, on very specific items,
directed the president and OMB not to interfere. In effect, the legislators and
interest groups attacked the president by burying the EPA in more bureaucracy.
As Percival describes it,
Congress has expressed its dissatisfaction with the consequences of regulatory
review by adding more specific statutory controls on agencies' discretion every
time it has reauthorized the environmental laws.
The result has been a distinct trend toward reduced flexibility
for agencies
1
charged with implementing the federal environmental statutes. 0

At the same time, another fascinating drama was unfolding. OIRA, as it
happens, was not really a Reagan creation. It had been created at the end of the
Carter period as part of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, and it was only
later that Reagan, via his famous executive order, put regulatory review in its
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hands.1" As a statutory agency, however, OIRA's authorization was set to run
out in 1983, and it had to weather the budgetary process every year to get
funding. So, in principle, it was vulnerable to congressional attack.
What happened? OIRA's opponents had a golden opportunity to shoot the
agency down, because reauthorization called for an affirmative act of Congress
and they needed only to block. In fact, the Act was not reauthorized. The
House went along, but the Senate did not. Reagan countered by instructing
OIRA to do what it had always done. But it was now acting without legislative
authorization; and this meant that, on a point of order, legislators could move to
deny the agency funding. No authorization, no funding. Yet opponents were
not able to make this work. During 1984 and 1985, OIRA was funded. In 1986,
the redoubtable John Dingell credibly threatened the point-of-order strategy, and
a bargain was struck with the White House: the Act would be reauthorized and
OIRA would get funding, but future agency heads would require Senate
confirmation and OIRA would have to increase public disclosures about its
review process.11 These were only minor concessions by Reagan. Were
legislators and groups really able to exercise power, they could have put OIRA
out of business. The President clearly had the upper hand. The regulatory
review system churned on, shaping and delaying regulations, and infuriating
groups and agencies.
The Bush years witnessed more of the same. Although Bush was not as
committed to regulatory review as Reagan, the basic structure of Executive
Order 12,291 remained in place. A less zealous OIRA continued to do its
presidential job, and interest groups continued to nibble away at their nemesis
through fragmented congressional action. Environmental groups scored an
indirect success (with Bush's assistance) through the Clean Air Act of 1990,
which buried the EPA in more bureaucratic constraints, directives, and
timetables. This bill, as Jonathan Rauch puts it, "is one of the most expensive
and complicated regulatory measures of the postwar years. It runs to almost 800
pages ....

They also took direct shots at OIRA, aided once again by its status as a

statutory agency with temporary authority. Its authority had been renewed in
1986, but it ran out again in three years, and this gave its opponents yet another
golden opportunity to put it out of business.

In 1990, legislators agreed to

reauthorize the Paperwork Reduction Act if Bush would accept certain
restrictions on OIRA powers, among them a sixty-day deadline for reviewing

rules and a requirement that it provide detailed explanations for any substantive
changes in rules.112 These were not major concessions, since they would leave
the entire regulatory review apparatus in place. Although Bush was willing to
go along, key Republican Senators opposed the bill for reasons of their own, and
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it was defeated."' The result left OIRA without authorization and thus
vulnerable to extinction. Yet the Administration continued to secure funding for
the agency throughout Bush's tenure in office.
In short, OIRA's legislative opponents had everything going for them, and
were still unable to stop regulatory review. They did, however, make trouble:
they defeated Bush's first nominee to head OIRA. The President then relied on
his executive flexibility, choosing not to submit another candidate, and instead
asking a careerist within OIRA to serve as acting head. He also took a look at
all the problems surrounding OIRA as a statutory agency and decided to change
strategy, shifting major responsibilities for regulatory review to the Competitiveness Council, a purely presidential unit headed by Vice President Dan
Quayle.114
This unit had been established for other reasons and given a broad
presidential mandate to look into issues ranging from legal reform to job
training. But it quickly delved deeply into regulatory review and, with staff
assistance from OIRA, became an influential and controversial force. For the
remainder of the Bush presidency, legislative opponents shifted their ire to the
Competitiveness Council and went after it in the usual ways." 5 But they were
never able to deny it funding;116 they had no basis for affecting personnel or
appointments; and they never passed legislation challenging the Council's right
to do what it did.
When the Democrats finally took back the White House in 1993, one of the
first things Bill Clinton did was to get rid of the Competitiveness Council. This
met with a joyous response from many legislators and groups, but it was a largely
symbolic act-for he most assuredly did not get rid of regulatory review. Indeed,
he saw regulatory review as essential to presidential leadership, and he soon
issued Executive Order 12,866, which, while repealing Reagan's Executive Order
12,291, reimposed a very similar structure of presidential review'17
At this writing, the Clinton style is still evolving. Review functions have been
returned to OIRA, and procedures are being revamped to reflect the new
President's agenda-by ensuring access, for example, to environmentalists, labor,
and other Clinton supporters. While it remains to be seen what will come of
this, the best guess is for "a fine-tuning of what has evolved over the past couple
of decades," ' a not a radical change.
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Overall, the story of regulatory review is more riddled with outright political
conflict than the others we have told. Attempts by presidents to expand their
institutional power have taken the form of attacks on specific interest groups,
and these groups have launched counterattacks against presidents. It is
Congress's good fortune to have been caught in the middle. For the groups have
been pressuring legislators to take actions that defend the interests of Congress
as an institution. This is why Congress has been more active and successful in
regulatory review than in the other areas we have looked at.
Nonetheless, their success has been quite limited. Regulatory review is now
a routine part of the executive process. Presidents began it, built it up, and
regularly exercised its powers in the face of group and legislative hostility.
Congress did not rise up and pass major legislation to stop them, although it had
the power to do so. It did not refuse to fund the review agencies, although it
also had the power to do that. Instead, it succeeded only in causing presidents
assorted hassles, imposing minor restrictions on regulatory review-and burying
the EPA still further in bureaucracy.
VI
CONCLUSION

We began this article by pointing out that rational choice theory is almost
entirely concerned with Congress and voting, and that it has little to say about
presidents. It should be noted, however, that the presidency has been highly
resistant over the years to genuinely productive theories of any kind. The reason
for this difficulty is that scholars have long insisted on seeing the presidency in
highly personal terms, as an institution built around a single person whose
personality, skills, experiences, ideology, and decisionmaking style are the prime
determinants of presidential behavior.
The perennial theme throughout the scholarly literature, accordingly, is that
presidents are unique individuals whose presidencies are largely reflections of
their personal characteristics."9 Given this view, and given the Pandora's box
that the "personal presidency" opens for scholars interested in explanation, it is
hardly surprising that the academic literature is heavily weighted with description, anecdote, and low-level generalizations. In Anthony King's wonderfully
appropriate phrase, "it's a theory-free zone.""12
The way to escape from this trap is to stop thinking of presidents as people,
and to start thinking of them generically as institutional actors. Something is
inevitably lost in the translation, but what is gained enables us to build genuine
theories of presidential behavior and to incorporate presidents into larger
theories of institutional politics. Rational choice is ideally suited for doing just
that.
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The tremendous success of rational choice theory with legislators attests to
its utility. It is evident that legislators are people too, and that their personalities, ideologies, conceptions of the job, and so forth, contribute to their behavior.
But positive theorists have built highly productive-and, over the years,
enormously influential-theories by stripping away all this and treating legislators
as generic institutional actors motivated by reelection.
Nothing prevents this from being done for the presidency. But as yet it
simply has not.12' Rational choice theorists, backed by a rich social choice
tradition, have found legislators more interesting and easier to deal with than
presidents, and virtually all their energies have been poured into building a
theoretical base in legislatures and moving outward from there-to presidents
who can veto legislation, to bureaucrats whom legislators must try to control, to
judges who can shift the legislative status quo.
While it is nice to think that someday this outward creep will result in a wellbalanced view of political institutions, the short-term result is not balanced at all.
The present world of rational choice is a legislative world in which everyone is
playing a legislative game. The president is not really the president. He is just
an actor who can veto legislation. And similarly for bureaucrats and judges.
They are not understood or treated as full-fledged actors in their own right, with
powers and motivational structures that are fully explored, modeled, and
integrated into a larger theory of which Congress is but a part. The notion that
this is truly a system of interconnected and roughly coequal parts gets lost in the
shuffle. For reasons that have little to do with substance, Congress emerges from
the literature as the driving force behind U.S. politics and institutions.
In this article, we have had two aims. First, we have tried to show that
presidents can be understood on their own terms, not as people that have to be
characterized in all their complexity and uniqueness, but as institutional actors
that have a distinctive analytic and substantive core. Whether we are talking
about Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter, or Ronald Reagan, the fundamental thing
to understand is that these individuals are all occupying the same institutional
role; and as such, they share certain distinctive goals, their incentives are
structured in the same basic ways, and their approaches to governing and
institution-building are much the same. Whatever their personalities and
ideologies, they are presidents and they behave presidentially. Because they do,
we can know reasonably well what to expect from them.
Second, we have tried to argue that, once a theory of U.S. institutions takes
presidents seriously, there is little basis for crowing about the formidable powers
of Congress, as positive theorists have been prone to do. This is not to say that
Congress is not powerful, but rather that the powers of presidents have gone
entirely unappreciated in this literature, and those powers are considerable.
Indeed, we think that, when rational choice turns its attention to the institutional
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struggle for power between the two, its logic suggests that presidents ought to
have important advantages over Congress in the politics of structure, due
especially to their capacity for unilateral action and Congress's debilitating
collective action problems. As institutions are created and modified over the
years, it is the president, not Congress, who is better equipped to enhance his
own institutional bases for power and, incrementally, to bring the various parts
of government under some semblence of coherent control.
The case studies suggest as much. Whether we talk about civil service
reform, regulatory review, or congressional oversight of the institutional
presidency, presidents have clearly been aggressive in seeking to expand the
scope of their powers by structural means. And Congress has typically been
disorganized, ineffective, and even passive in its response. As we saw, presidents
did not always get their way, and Congress did not always fail to act. Indeed,
there are so many obstacles to genuine action in the U.S. separation of powers
system that it is sometimes a wonder that anything happens at all. But when it
does, and when it is geared to alter the balance of power, it is almost invariably
because the president is pushing and shoving to occupy new institutional terrain,
and because Congress does not have what it takes to stop him. This is no
accident. It is built-in.
Doubtless, most positive theorists will object to our savaging of Congress and
argue that it actually has major advantages over the president. There may be
some. Our focus has been on the president, and we have been unable to devote
attention to Congress's own attempts at institution-building. A more extensive
analysis would take a look, for instance, at the Congressional Budget Office, the
War Powers Act, the tremendous growth in congressional staff, and other recent
developments that might counterbalance the institutional presidency. But there
should be no surprises here. The new congressional budgetary process is a
disaster of fragmentation and irresponsibility. The War Powers Act has largely
been ignored by presidents. And legislative staff spend most of their time
pursuing the parochialism and special interests that so animate their bosses.
Were the picture fully drawn, we still believe that Congress would not prove
nearly as well equipped to defend or promote its own interests as the president
is.

In the end, we may or may not be entirely correct in this. Either way, we
look forward to the time when rational choice can speak confidently to the issue,
offering a theory that has as much to say about presidents-and bureaucrats and
judges-as it has to say about legislators.

